St. John's University School of Law

St. John's Law Scholarship Repository
Bankruptcy Research Library

Center for Bankruptcy Studies

2017

Creditor’s Failure to File a Proof of Claim is Inexcusable Where
Potential Danger of Prejudice to Debtor Exists
Meghan Lombardo

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/bankruptcy_research_library
Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons
This Research Memorandum is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for Bankruptcy Studies at St.
John's Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Bankruptcy Research Library by an
authorized administrator of St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
selbyc@stjohns.edu.

“Bankruptcy Code”).5 The court in Pioneer determined that because Congress provided no
guideposts for evaluating whether neglect is excusable, the analysis should be an equitable one
that focused on the danger of prejudice to the debtor.6 Thus, the court created a four-factor
balancing test to determine when prejudice to the debtor makes an attorney’s neglect
inexcusable.
The Pioneer factors present a high burden to overcome. Indeed, there are very few cases
in which a court allowed a creditor to file a late claim. This memorandum explores under what
circumstances the court will allow a late file claim. Part I discusses the Pioneer case and
analyzes the Supreme Court’s adoption and application of the four “Pioneer factors.” Part II
examines a recent case in which a court applied the Pioneer factors, found excusable neglect,
and allowed a creditor to file a late proof of claim. Part III addresses the Southern District of
New York’s elaboration of each of the factors in In re Lyondell, in which the court gives a
thorough analysis of each fact and its respective applicability.
I.

The Pioneer Factors
In Pioneer, certain creditors filed their proofs of claim after the deadline (i.e., the bar

date) for the filing of proofs of claim. In connection with the late claim filings, the creditors
also filed a motion requesting permission for the late filings under Rule 9006(b)(1). In an attempt
to qualify the late filing as excusable neglect, creditor’s counsel explained that he had recently
left his former law firm and had been in a state of disruption and upheaval.7 The Bankruptcy
Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, following precedent from the Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit, held that a party may claim excusable neglect only if its “failure to timely
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perform a duty was due to circumstances which were beyond its reasonable control.”8 Because
the court found that the creditors had received notice of the bar date and could have reasonably
complied, it denied the creditors’ motion and refused the late filing.
On appeal, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee found
“respectable authority” for the narrow reading of excusable neglect by the Bankruptcy Court, but
concluded that the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which is where the Bankruptcy Court
is located, would follow a more liberal approach. The District Court borrowed the relatively
liberal test announced by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that evaluates several factors
in respondent’s conduct including: (1) whether granting the delay will prejudice the debtor; (2)
the length of delay; (3) whether the delay was beyond the reasonable control of the person whose
duty it was to perform; (4) whether the creditor acted in good faith; and (5) whether clients
should be penalized for their counsel’s mistake or neglect.9 The District Court also stated that, on
remand, the Bankruptcy Court should consider whether the failure to file the claims by the bar
date resulted from negligence, indifference, or culpable conduct on the part of the moving
creditor.10
On remand, the Bankruptcy Court again denied respondent’s motion and the District
Court affirmed the ruling. However, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed after
concluding that excusable neglect is not limited to cases where the failure to timely act is due to
circumstances beyond the movant’s control.11
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On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed that a flexible interpretation of excusable neglect
coincides with the policies underlying Chapter 11 and the bankruptcy rules.12 According to the
Court, the history of Rule 9006(b)(1) supports the conclusion that the extension of the time
periods under the excusable neglect standard is not limited to circumstances beyond the party’s
control. To determine whether neglect should be considered “excusable,” the Court identified the
following four factors that considered all relevant circumstances surrounding the party’s
omission:
(1) Danger of prejudice to the debtor;
(2) The length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings;
(3) The reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of
the movant; and
(4) Whether the movant acted in good faith.13
The Court, however, rejected the Sixth Circuit’s suggestion that it would be inappropriate
to penalize respondents for the omissions of their attorney. According to the Court, the Court of
Appeals should have considered whether the attorney, as the respondent’s agent, did all he
reasonably could to comply with the court-ordered bar, rather than whether the respondents did
all they reasonably could in policing the conduct of their attorney.14
Despite finding that the Sixth Circuit erred in this part of its analysis, the Supreme Court
concluded that the result was still correct. The Court concluded that there was no evidence of
prejudice to the petitioner and there was no indication of bad faith, and that the unusual form of
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notice used in this case confirmed that the neglect of the respondent’s counsel was, considering
all the circumstances, excusable.15
II.

Pioneer Factors Applied in In re LMM Sports Management
In June 2016, the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit

commented on excusable neglect and its potentially prejudicial effects. In In re LMM Sports
Management, appellant Warner Angle Hallam Jackson & Formancek, P.L.C. (“Warner Angle”)
filed proofs of claim against the debtor, LMM Sports Management (“LMM”) for legal services it
provided to LMM in connection with a prior state court case against Your Source Pacific Fund I,
LLP (“Your Source”).16 In the state court case, Your Source obtained a $2.4 million judgment
against LMM, causing LMM to file for protection under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. The
bankruptcy court approved a settlement of $1.5 million between Your Source and LMM
(represented by new counsel) in full satisfaction of Your Source’s judgment over Warner
Angle’s objection. Warner Angle filed its objection to the Debtor’s settlement motion on
February 17, 2015, two months after the bar date. One day later, Warner Angle belatedly filed
the proofs of claim. The Debtor objected to the proofs of claim arguing they should be
disallowed as untimely. Warner Angle then filed a cross-motion requesting that the proofs be
treated as timely because the late filing was the result of excusable neglect. The bankruptcy court
rejected Warner Angle’s excusable neglect argument and denied its reconsideration motion.
Warner Angle appealed.
The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit noted that requests to file a late proof
of claim based on excusable neglect should be analyzed by considering the totality of the
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circumstances and by focusing on the four specific factors established in Pioneer. (1) the danger
of prejudice to the non-moving party; (2) the length of delay and its potential impact on judicial
proceedings; (3) the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control
of the movant; and (4) whether the moving party’s conduct was in good faith.17
The lower bankruptcy court found that Warner Angle had satisfied two of the four
Pioneer factors; Warner Angle (1) acted in good faith, and (2) established that the length of
delay was relatively minor and did not influence the debtor’s bankruptcy cases.18 Warner Angle
conceded that there was not a good reason for the delay and that avoiding the delay would have
been within Warner Angle’s reasonable control.19 On appeal, Warner Angle focused on the
“danger of prejudice” element. The lower court found that if Warner Angle had timely filed its
proofs of claim, LMM would have had the option to consider a different path than the one they
chose, which involved finalizing and submitting their settlement agreement for approval with
Your Source.20 Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel concluded that LMM would be
prejudiced by allowing Warner Angle to file a late claim.
III.

The Pioneer Factors Elaborated Upon in In re Lyondell Chemical Co.
The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York found that excusable

neglect should be elastic in its application and should be fact specific rather than held to a rigid
standard.21 In In re Lyondell, a trustee did not request an extension of time to move to substitute
a new executor to the deceased defendant’s estate within the 90-day period specified by the
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court.22 The court applied the Pioneer factors, and elaborated on the proper weight each factor
should be given.
The court opined that the first Pioneer factor, danger of prejudice to the non-moving
party, is more complex than a “simple dollar-for-dollar depletion of assets otherwise available
for timely filed claims.23 Courts apply more than this simple analysis by delving into any adverse
impacts a claim might have on the judicial administration of the case.24
With regard to the second factor, the length of delay and its potential impact on judicial
proceedings, the Bankruptcy Court considered the Second Circuit’s opinion in In re Enron
Corp.,25 that the length of delay in time is only given meaning by its effect on the administration
of the case and that there has been no court which established a bright-line rule to determine
when the lateness of a claim would be considered substantial.26
The Bankruptcy Court emphasized the third factor -- reason for delay -- noting that it is
the “predominant factor” and should be given the most weight.27 The fourth factor, good faith, is
rarely at issue.28 Though there is no formal presumption of good faith, courts have stated that a
record lacking bad faith provides appropriate grounds for a finding of good faith.
The Lyondell court focused primarily on the third factor. According to the court, the
evidence demonstrated that the trustee, for reasons beyond his control, could not substitute the
executor of the defendant on the proof of claim. Consequently, the court found the trustee’s
neglect excusable. The court stated that where an unusual form of notice provides an “adequate
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reason” for the delay and where there is no indication of any “intentional effort to withhold
information from the claimant,” the negligence should be found excusable.29
Conclusion
When determining whether to allow a late filing, a court will consider all four of the
Pioneer factors in determining if excusable neglect exists. Courts, however, will likely focus
principally on reason for the delay. As illustrated in the cases discussed herein, determining
whether late filings of proofs of claim will be considered excusable is extremely fact-specific and
depends heavily upon circumstances and whether those circumstances were within the movant's
reasonable control.
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